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SUMMARYAs long as the crisis was expected to be short-lived, Europe could
afford not to reflect on its potential consequences for medium-term
growth. Urgent tasks ahead and the longer-term agenda could remain dis-
connected. This is no longer justified. Indeed, the seeds of future growth
performance are sown – or not – during crises. Countries that have gone
through deep crises have found that the loss in output is generally not
recovered rapidly, if at all, and that medium-term performance depends on
the choice of crisis management measures. Five factors can either help or
harm medium-term growth: the size and duration of stimulus packages;
their content; labour market policies; bank restructuring and lending
behaviour; and research and development expenditures.
POLICY CHALLENGE
Policies that can improve medium-term performance should be prioritised.
This leads to six policy recommendations: i) governments should explicitly
announce state-contingent, not time-contingent, budgetary strategies; ii)
stimulus packages should put more
emphasis on pro-growth policies such
as education and innovation; iii) bank
restructuring should be speeded-up;
iv) employment support should be
temporary, economy-wide, and should
avoid favouring particular firms or
sectors, or taking people out of the
labour market; v) support to large
firms in traditional industries should
be conditional on restructuring; vi)
the pro-cyclicality of innovation
efforts should be addressed in order
to limit the fall in R&D intensity during
the crisis and sow the seeds of pro-
ductivity gains when recovery starts.
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Figure 1: Industrial output in Europe and the US, current and previous
recession episodes
Sources: National statistical agencies, Bruegel calculations
businesses, and ultimately public
finances, suffered major losses.
By contrast, Sweden reacted swift-
ly. It recapitalised the viable
banks, nationalised the insolvent
ones and used the recession as an
opportunity for economic transfor-
mation. In the years that followed
the crisis, productivity slowed in
Japan, whereas it accelerated
markedly in Sweden. Eventually,
Japan settled for a lower growth
rate while Sweden was able to
recoup the output loss entirely
(Frontpage figure and Table 1). 
What these opposite cases illus-
trate is that policies implemented
during a crisis and in response to it
can have a major bearing on long-
term growth. This is because a
deep crisis involves hysteresis. It
leaves its mark even after it has
passed because workers may – or
may not – remain jobless, and
because innovation may falter – or
thrive. Policymakers must there-
fore systematically assess the
longer-term consequences of the
choices they make in response to
the needs of the moment. 
While managing the crisis, govern-
ments need to target three closely
related objectives: 
• Eliminate the output gap pro-
duced by the crisis, 
• Avoid a permanent loss of
potential output resulting from
a contraction of the labour
force, and 
• Keep productivity gains on
track. 
Section 2 of this Policy Brief inves-
tigates five channels through
which crisis measures can either
help or harm medium-term growth:
the size and duration of stimulus
financial crises that led to deep
recessions: Finland, Japan, South
Korea and Sweden, all in the 1990s. 
Figure 2 illustrates the main les-
son from these episodes. As a rule,
deep crises result in permanent
loss of output: after the shock, the
economy resumes growth at the
same rate, but labour input
remains lower, and thus also the
growth path. This lesson from
crisis episodes in four advanced
economies is confirmed by the
experience with crises among a
wider sample of countries over a
longer period (Cerra and Saxena,
2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).
But national policy choices matter
in determining the outcome. The
clearest contrast here is between
Japan and Sweden. Japan’s
actions turned out to be weak,
belated and ill-designed. Banks
were allowed to hide losses for too
long and, as a consequence, they
survived for an extended period
without being able to perform their
economic role. As a result,
Japanese households and
ALTHOUGH THE CRISIS ORIGINATED
IN THE US, Europe’s outlook has
deteriorated more sharply, as indi-
cated by revisions of the
International Monetary Fund’s
forecasts over the last twelve
months. Industrial production
indices in the US and the three
largest EU countries confirm that
Europe is being hit at least as hard
as the US, and that this crisis is
worse than any of the severest
downturns observed during the
post-war era (Figure 1).
The latest monthly figures give
hope that the bottom might be in
sight. The questions are then how
to stimulate the rebound, what
type of recovery can be expected,
and what the crisis’s longer term
consequences will be. Experience
indicates that the answer to the
last two questions depends cru-
cially on policy choices made
while managing the downturn.
1 LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS CRISES
In recent decades four developed
countries have been hit byHANDLE WITH CARE! POST-CRISIS GROWTH IN THE EU
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Source: GGDC 10-sector database, Bruegel calculations.
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Figure 2: Impact of major financial crises in four economies
Source: Bruegel calculations. The graph depicts the unweighted average of GDP, total hours worked
and GDP per hour before and after the major financial and economic crises that occurred in four
countries: Japan in 1997, Sweden in 1991, Finland in 1991 and South Korea in 1997. ‘T’ stands for
the year of the crisis.
Table 1
Labour productivity growth before and after the crises in Japan and Sweden
All sectors Manufacturing Construction
Wholesale and
retail trade, hotels
and restaurants
Sweden 1984-1990 1.46% 1.73% 1.21% 1.23%
Sweden 1991-1997 3.61% 7.72% 3.25% 4.53%
Sweden 1998-2005 2.49% 6.94% -0.31% 3.55%
Japan 1984-1990 3.73% 4.56% 4.99% 5.89%
Japan 1991-1997 0.99% 2.65% -4.57% 2.94%
Japan 1998-2003 1.41% 3.73% -0.57% -1.01%
Table 2
Policy objectives and policy channels
Eliminate
output gap
Avoid permanent
potential output loss
Keep productivity
on track
Size stimulus package
Content of stim. pack.
Labour markets
Bank restructuring
R&D
Note: column headings indicate objectives; row headings indicate policy channels. Dark red
indicates primary effect, light red indicates secondary effect. 
packages; their content; labour
market policies; bank restructur-
ing and lending behaviour; and
research and development expen-
ditures. Section 3 concludes and
makes policy recommendations. 
2 FIVE POLICY CHANNELS
a. The size of stimulus packages
Recourse to budgetary policy
became necessary in autumn
2008 when demand was collaps-
ing and that the dire state of the
banking system was rendering
monetary policy partially ineffec-
tive. It was justified because
macroeconomic conditions were
precisely those in which budgetary
stimulus can be effective.
Governments in Europe responded
with unequal speed and intensity.
For the EU as a whole, the
budgetary response in 2009 may
be estimated to be of the order of
0.95 percent of GDP (Saha and von
Weizsäcker, 2009). This is signifi-
cant, but markedly less than advo-
cated by the IMF (two percent of
GDP) and also less than what the
US stimulus is expected to deliver
(about two percent of GDP in
2009). This remains true even
when automatic stabilisers are
taken into account. According to
Bruegel’s calculations, the auto-
matic increase in spending as a
result of the crisis will only add 0.2
percent of GDP to the Europe’s 
discretionary stimulus.
Quantitatively, Europe is delivering
a timid Keynesian response to a
very Keynesian situation. 
Two factors are behind the
relatively weak EU response, both
related to its fragmentation. First,
for any given EU country a large
part of the benefits of a stimulus
accrue not to itself but to its trade
partners. Second, although the
public debt ratio on the eve of the
crisis was roughly the same in the
US and the EU, individual fiscal sit-
uations vary significantly within
Europe. Italy, for example, is cau-
tious because its public debt ratio
already exceeds 100 percent of
GDP and its rating is only A+, not
AAA as for Germany and France. 
Looking beyond the short-term
response, what budgetary policy
can or cannot do depends on theb
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Figure 3: Breakdown by spending category of selected EU stimulus
packages for 2009
Source: Bruegel, Saha and von Weizsäcker (2009).
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Figure 4: Composition of EU
stimulus package for 2009
nature of the shock. Budgetary
support is an appropriate
response to the extent that it helps
to offset a temporary demand
shock and replace private demand
by public demand at a time when
private agents cannot rely on
impaired financial markets to
absorb shocks. Beyond its imme-
diate impact on product and labour
markets, budgetary support may
prevent lasting damage, such as
the failure of profitable companies
and the writing-off of precious
human capital. But in the case of a
longer term shortfall in supply, it
would be a major mistake to use
budgetary policy in an attempt to
lift output above potential. 
As a consequence, budgetary sup-
port should be maintained as long
as a temporary demand shock pre-
vails. But it should be withdrawn
as soon as the recovery is strong
enough to be self-sustaining, even
if the post-recovery growth trajec-
tory turns out to be lower than it
was before the crisis. 
This analysis implies that judge-
ment must be exercised regarding
the underlying economic situation
and the reasons why output is
lower than previously expected. It
also requires public spending itself
to be sustainable. Sustainability-
enhancing reforms of the type dis-
cussed in Pisani-Ferry et al.
(2008) and improvements in the
institutional framework of national
budgetary policies are needed to
ensure that this is the case. 
b. The content of stimulus packages
The composition of stimulus
packages matters for medium-
term growth. Public spending on
education and innovation can help
build a platform for sustained pro-
ductivity gains in the long term.
Properly targeted spending can
also help overcome resistance to
efficiency-enhancing labour and
product-market reform.
Choices made at end-2008 were in
some cases directed at pure
demand-side effects. The best
examples are perhaps the United
Kingdom and Austrian stimulus
packages, which rely mostly on tax
cuts. Other countries made differ-
ent choices, sometimes more
supply-side oriented, and the
result is that packages differ wide-
ly as regards their composition
(Figure 3). Evidently, national
choices were not made in accor-
dance with an agreed EU medium-
term strategy.
For the EU as a whole, about half of
the stimulus goes to tax cuts
(Figure 4), with the aim of boost-
ing demand (few packages include
genuine tax reforms). The other
large share (36 percent) goes to
public investment, most of which
benefits non-traded domestic
sectors such as construction. This
is often justified by reference to
foreign trade ‘leakage’. However,
such a choice is open to criticism:
first, it is essentially non-coopera-
tive; second, as indicated in Figure
1, manufacturing suffers most
from the crisis, not the trade-shel-
tered sectors; third, low supply
elasticity in some non-traded
goods sectors, such as public
works, may in fact result in higherHANDLE WITH CARE! POST-CRISIS GROWTH IN THE EU
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1We focus here on male
employment and par-
ticipation rates (female
labour market data is
more difficult to com-
pare owing to differing
social trends between
countries).
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Figure 5: Male unemployment rate in Finland, Japan, Korea and Sweden
(1980-2007)
Source: Bruegel, based on OECD data.
prices in these sectors, a form of
leakage that undermines impact.
Finally, the contribution of public
investment to future growth may
be low in Europe, where infrastruc-
ture is already well developed.
Japan’s experience with bridges
from nowhere to nowhere in the
1990s should serve as a reminder
of the potential cost of politically
determined public investments.
One important way in which the
stimulus packages could be
aligned with the promotion of
growth is by supporting research
and innovation. While many of the
packages contain some such ele-
ments, the diversity of the meas-
ures makes any assessment of
the total research and innovation
content of the stimulus packages
far from straightforward. But it
would be hard to characterise the
European stimulus as innovation-
friendly. If one takes a narrow view
that excludes indirect support
such as construction and research
subsidies to mature industries,
the proportion devoted to
innovation might be as low as one
percent. If a broader view is taken,
including the large construction
component for educational
institutions in Germany and
innovation subsidies for mature
industries, spending on innovation
could be in excess of 10 percent.
Whatever the measure, this is
unlikely to deliver the innovation
boost that was called for in the
EU’s Lisbon strategy.
c. Labour market policies
Figure 2 shows that labour mar-
kets play a key role in determining
whether crises have lasting
effects. Policymakers are in this
respect confronted with unusual
crises in the 1990s reacted differ-
ently. Sweden and Finland saw a
sharp increase in the unemploy-
ment rate and a slight decrease in
the participation rate. Japan and
to a lesser extent South Korea had
more stable unemployment and
participation rates (Figure 5)
1. So
Japan, and to a smaller extent
South Korea, retained idle workers
within companies more often than
their European counterparts. But
the two Nordic countries relied on
active labour market policies to
avoid laid-off workers exiting the
labour market altogether.
Appropriate policies depend on
domestic labour market
institutions but there are common
principles. Early retirement is
clearly ill-advised as it overbur-
dens the pension system with peo-
ple who should be active and in
many cases would like to work
again. The same applies to all other
measures having a permanent
effect. However, there can be a
case for temporarily discouraging
immediate payroll adjustment. In
a severe crisis, allowing redundan-
cies to occur and subsequently
choices. It is relatively straightfor-
ward to deal with collective redun-
dancies and bankruptcies in the
case of an individual company or a
sector-specific shock. The key is to
smooth the transition into new
jobs for those workers who are laid
off. The three typical policy mis-
takes in such circumstances are:
(i) large subsidies for ailing
companies in order to keep them
alive against any economic logic;
(ii) labour market and unemploy-
ment benefit regimes that exces-
sively prolong the transition time
in unemployment; (iii) early retire-
ment schemes. All these mistakes
have been committed in the past.
Early retirement policies in
particular were used during the
1980s in several European
countries, triggering a major drop
in the participation rate in the 55-
65 age bracket. This proved to be a
socially controversial, fiscally
costly and economically ineffi-
cient choice. 
But the question now is what to do
when confronting a deep, across-
the-board recession. The four
countries witnessing significantHANDLE WITH CARE! POST-CRISIS GROWTH IN THE EU
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to companies in order to avoid
bankruptcies. In a financial crisis,
the Schumpeterian ‘cleansing’
effect of recessions does not
apply correctly because financial
markets are unable to foster effi-
cient capital reallocation. On the
contrary, companies first hit are
the younger, cash-poor firms that
often have good growth potential.
It is therefore appropriate to use
available channels to extend cred-
it to firms that are viable but at risk
through liquidity shortage. As dis-
tressed banks tend to curtail credit,
there is a case for requesting lend-
ing commitments from them as a
counterpart to capital injections.
However, there remains a risk of
distorting incentives. Big
companies employ workforces
that no government wants to see
on the streets. Young innovators
bring ‘only’ potential change and
have by definition little lobbying
clout. Political pressure and risk
aversion can interact with each
other, resulting in banks favouring
companies they perceive as too
big, or too politically protected, to
fail. The more the banks are them-
selves dependent on government
support, the more they may be
inclined towards such behaviour. 
These risks are illustrated by
Japan’s ‘lost decade’ example. As
indicated in Figure 6, bank rescue
operations in Japan extended over
more than a decade, whereas they
moved much faster in Sweden.
Throughout that period many
Japanese banks behaved as ‘zom-
bies’ and discriminated against
small enterprises.
Such behaviour has been identi-
fied as a key cause of Japan’s low
productivity growth in the 1990s
retraining workers may not be effi-
cient if impaired markets block the
reallocation mechanism. Instead,
keeping employees active in some
form may be efficient.  
Such employment support should
be delivered through labour mar-
ket measures, for example
government-subsidised short-time
work, such as the Kurzarbeit
scheme in Germany. Temporary
work-sharing arrangements and
flexible working hours, which allow
overtime when business is strong
in return for additional leave when
business is weak, may have a sim-
ilarly positive effect. In general,
forms of labour-market flexibility
that do not have the negative side-
effect of accelerating the rise of
unemployment in the crisis can
contribute positively. 
Rather than acting through labour
market instruments, there will
always be a political temptation to
rescue particularly large industrial
companies using government
funds. Such operations pose prob-
lems from the design stage and
may be difficult to end. In addition,
there is a real risk of precipitating
a low-growth scenario as occurred
in Japan, where a significant pro-
portion of the economy consisted
for a lengthy period of zombie
companies kept alive only at the
discretion of the government. They
stifle economic growth, while pre-
venting reallocation of resources
to sectors with higher growth
potential.
d. Zombie lending and productivity
A natural response to the collapse
in demand and credit restrictions
resulting from the state of the
banking sector is to extend credit
(Ahearne and Shinada, 2005).
This phenomenon is noticeable in
aggregate productivity figures
(Table 1), and the significance of
this channel can be verified at the
microeconomic level. In the case
of Japan, Caballero et al (2006)
have found that the higher the pro-
portion of zombie firms in a given
sector, the lower the investment
ratio of non-zombie firms. They
also noted a correlation between
the density of ineffective firms in a
sector and its total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) growth.
The victims of a dysfunctional
credit system are typically young
innovative companies (‘YICs’), an
efficient means of improving long-
term growth prospects. The nega-
tive impact of the crisis on YICs
extends far beyond the direct
impact on their survival and the
breakthrough innovations that
YICs generate. As these companies
often trigger innovation by incum-
bent firms, their indirect effect is
also significant. But they combine
the disadvantages of small scale,
a short credit history, lower
retained earnings and more risky
projects, and are more likely to be
financially constrained. Public
policy should thus provide better
access to finance for entrepre-
neurial projects typified by the
activity of YICs, as proposed in
Veugelers (2009). And policy
should first and foremost expedite
banking system restructuring. 
e. The cyclicality of R&D
expenditures
Notwithstanding the importance of
YICs, large firms conduct most
R&D. Their investments are driven
by (expected) returns, and will
therefore be reduced whenHANDLE WITH CARE! POST-CRISIS GROWTH IN THE EU
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Figure 6: Distribution of bank losses over time in
Japan and Sweden
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3The reverse could
however be argued,
based on inter-temporal
substitution: the oppor-
tunity costs of achiev-
ing growth are lower in
recessions, and hence
firms have more incen-
tive to undertake R&D
in downturns and
launch new products in
upturns.  This is,
however, rarely
observed.
sown – or not sown. In a situation
where the duration and depth of
the crisis remain uncertain, the
acid test for all policy is twofold:
• Is the policy course sustainable
even if recovery is delayed? 
• Does the policy course con-
tribute to medium-term eco-
nomic performance? 
This analysis leads to the following
recommendations:
1. Budgetary policy: governments
should formally announce that
stimulus measures will remain
in place as long as economic
conditions require, even if the
duration of the crisis turns out
to be longer than expected. This
in turn implies ensuring medi-
um-term public finance
sustainability through enacting
reforms (for example of pen-
sions) that improve the inter-
temporal budget balance and
investing in the quality of policy
institutions to enhance the
credibility of commitments to
future retrenchment. By the
same token, governments
should announce that stimulus
measures will be removed as
can increase demand for innova-
tive products in recessions, so as
to mitigate the negative impact on
firms’ incentives to invest in inno-
vative activities in the first place.
Governments can also subsidise
firms in recessions to help them to
refinance innovative activities in
spite of tight cash flow. During the
crisis of the 1990s Japan actually
succeeded in preserving a high
level of R&D intensity, despite a
drop-off in economic activity. This
policy allowed the country to stay
specialised in high-tech industries
and to avoid a more abrupt eco-
nomic collapse than would other-
wise have been the case.
3. CONCLUSIONS
As long as the crisis was expected
to be short-lived, Europe could
afford not to reflect on its potential
consequences for medium-term
growth. Urgent needs of the
moment and the longer-term policy
agenda could remain disconnect-
ed. And until now they have been. 
But this disconnect is no longer
tenable. It is during crises that the
seeds of future performance are
(expected) profits are lower (van
Pottelsberghe 2008), such as in
periods of economic crisis
3.
Entrepreneurs’ ability to finance
innovation typically depends upon
their cash flow, which is in turn
affected by the aggregate state of
the economy: it is typically lower
in recessions than in booms. 
The evidence confirms that busi-
ness R&D outlays are highly pro-
cyclical. The quantitative analysis
performed by Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe (2003) suggests
that the long-run elasticity of busi-
ness R&D outlays with respect to
GDP is about 1.5 (ie, a one percent
increase in GDP induces a 1.5
percent increase in business R&D
outlays). This relationship is illus-
trated in Figure 7, which shows the
growth rates of GDP, privately
funded R&D and government-
funded R&D over the past 25
years. The pro-cyclicality of busi-
ness R&D is clearly apparent, with
a much higher volatility than GDP.
This negative impact of aggregate
volatility on innovation calls for
countercyclical government
action. For instance, governmentsb
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soon as economic conditions
show sustained improvement,
even if the pace of growth is
less than pre-crisis. In other
words, measures should be
accompanied by an exit
strategy and be made state-
rather than time-contingent.
They should be accompanied
by sustainability-enhancing
reforms of public finances.
2. Stimulus packages: for 2010,
to be revised to put greater
emphasis on priorities that are
consistent with structural
improvements to Europe’s
growth potential. Currently, EU
priorities for education,
innovation and other pro-
growth policies have not been
sufficiently reflected. This is a
missed opportunity. 
3. Financial system: if dysfunc-
tional, there is a high medium-
term economic cost for produc-
tivity and employment. Thus,
bank restructuring should be
speeded-up, to avoid zombie
behaviour and the associated
misallocation of capital.
4. Employment support: should
be implemented through labour
market policies and designed in
a way that minimises the risk
of lasting damage. This implies
avoiding all measures that take
workers out of the labour mar-
ket altogether, and avoiding
support for labour markets
through direct aid to firms.
Governments may instead pro-
vide temporary, across-the-
board incentives for companies
to retain employees.
5. Large firms in traditional indus-
tries: any aid should be condi-
tional upon restructuring.
Financial support to the busi-
ness sector should be reserved
to a significant extent to young
innovative firms that inherently
face severe credit constraints.
6. Innovation: procyclical behav-
iour should be countered
through specific tax incentives
or subsidies in order to limit the
fall in R&D intensity during the
downturn and prepare the
ground for productivity gains in
the recovery.
Consistent with the EU’s Lisbon
strategy, it is the task of the
European Commission and the EU
Council presidency to monitor
national initiatives, assess their
effectiveness and promote debate
on the medium-term impact of
crisis management policies.
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